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Luís Antônio Cunha Ribeiro, Rio de Janeiro / Brazil
1 
 
The Foucaultian Archaeological Method in Giorgo Agamben 
 
Abstract:  Agamben  has  claimed  to  work  inside  the  tradition  inaugurated  by  the  archaeological 
method  of  Michel  Foucault  but  not  to  fully  coincide  with  it.  “My  method  is  archaeological  and 
paradigmatic in a sense which is very close to that of Foucault, but not completely coincident with it.  
The question is, facing the dichotomies that structuralize our culture,  to go beyond the exceptions that 
have been producing the former, however, not to find a chronologically originary state, but to be able 
to understand the situation in which we are.  Archaeology is, in this sense, the only way to access 
present” (interview to Flavia Costa, trad. Susana Scramim, in Revista do Departamento de Psicologia 
– Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, v. 18 - n. 1, 131-136, Jan./Jun. 2006, 132, translated by 
the author).  However, the aspects in which Agamben follows Foucault's method and the ones he does 
not  were  never  very  clear.  This  situation  seems  to  change  with  the  edition  of  Agamben's  most 
extensive and explicit texts on method, Signatura Rerum. Sul Metodo (2008, italian edition). The goal 
of this article is to identify the points of intersection between their methods and some points in which 
they differ.   
Keywords: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, 
Archaeological Method, Archaeology of Knowledge, homo sacer, Signatura Rerum 
 
The subject of this paper is a preliminary investigation concerning the use of the foucaultian 
archaeological method by Giorgio Agamben
2.  The design of the archaeological method by 
Michel Foucault in his works Folie et déraison, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (1961)
3, 
Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical (1963)
4, Les mots et les choses. 
Une archéologie des sciences humaines (1966)
5 and L'Archéologie du savoir (1969)
6, among 
others may be not fully clear until today and has been the subject of many misunderstandings 
from the very beginning, many of which were pointed by Foucault himself. 
                                                           
1 Professor at Universidade Federal Fluminense. 
2 In this first moment, we try a comparison having in mind the archaeological method as designed by Michel 
Foucault in L'Archéologie du savoir (1969), published in English as The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: 
Tavistock, 1972. We do so, because this book has method as its main subject, but we intend to develop this 
investigation into asking if archaeological method may have changed in any aspects, in later Foucault works. 
3 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, London: Tavistock, 
1965. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, an archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage Books, 
1994. 
6  See Foucault (note  1). The pages quoted in this paper are from the brazilian edition, Michel Foucault, 
Arqueologia do Saber, Petrópolis: Vozes, 1972, and will be quoted just as AS, followed by the pages number.  
All the translations to English of sources not quoted in that language where made by the author of this paper. 2 
In a couple of passages, Agamben establishes the connection of his works and Foucault's 
ones. We quote one of them: 
My method is archaeological and paradigmatic in a sense very close to that of Foucault, 
but not completely coincident with it.  It is a matter of, before the dichotomies that structurize 
our culture, going beyond the exceptions that have produced them, although not to find a 
chronologically originary state, but, on the contrary, to be able to understand the situation in 
which we find ourselves.  The archaeology is, in this sense, the only way of access to present.  
However, going beyond the binary logics means, above all, to be able to more and more 
transform  the  dichotomies  in  bipolarities,  the  substantial  oppositions  in  a  field  of  forces 
covered by polar tensions which are present in each one of its points, without the possibility 
of stablishing precise demarcation lines.  Logics of the field against logics of the substance.  
This means, among other things, that between A and A a third element is given, which cannot 
be, however, a new homogeneous element, similar the former ones: it is not anything but the 
neutralization  and  transformation  of  the  two  others.  This  means,  finally,  to  work  by 
paradigms, neutralizing the false dichotomy between universal and particular.  A paradigm 
(the Greek term means simply “example”) is a  particular phenomenon that, being so, worths 
for every case of the same gender e acquires, thus, the capacity of building a more ample 
problematic set.  (...) In this sense, in my work, I used constantly paradigms: the homo sacer 
is not only an obscure figure of the archaic Roman Law, but also the cipher to understand the 
contemporary biopolitics. The same can be said of the “muslim” in Auschwitz and of the 
State of Exception.
7     
As seen, Agamben does not claim to simply follow Foucault's method, but to work in a 
way “very close” to it.  It is not a very clear statement but we intend to try to identify at least 
at some points how both methods might be connected and to raise some questions about it.  In 
order to do this we should first try to reunite the main characteristics of Foucault's method.  
After  Folie et déraison,  Naissance de la clinique and  Les mots et les choses, the main works 
in which the archaeological method was tried and employed, not always in the same way, for 
it shifted here and there at each new venture,  L'Archéologie du savoir was the work in which 
Foucault tried to elaborate just on his method.  It carries the advantage of being written after 
the three other mentioned works, so Foucault would be able not only to develop explanations 
on a method he had already been using and perfecting for some time, but also to clarify some 
misunderstandings about it and also the way it changed along the way.  These are the reasons 
why I choose this work as the main source about Foucault's archaeological method. 
                                                           
7  Interview  of  Giorgio  Agamben  by  Flavia  Costa,  trans.  Susana  Scramim,  in  Revista  do  Departamento  de 
Psicologia – Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói, v. 18 - n. 1 p. 131-136, Jan./Jun. 2006, 132.   3 
On the introduction of AS, Foucault identifies a major trend in history as a science, one 
that was already felt for some decades, as Foucault says, the trend to focus on long periods of 
time.  Foucault is pointing to the way groups of historians as that know as the Annales School 
tried,  in  France,  to  shift  from  the  so  called  positivist  attitude  in  history,  marked  by  the 
description of events in a linear causal succession, to the goal of observing the medium and 
long term evolution of civilization, neglecting events that would now be seen just as surface 
disturbances, to use an expression of Georges Duby.  In the words of Foucault, “as far as one 
descends to the most deep basis, the cuts are gradually larger”, revealing “histories almost 
immobile  to  the  eye”
8.  A  new  time,  a  new  temporality  in  history  was  being  invented. 
However, the history of ideas was experimenting other tendencies, according to Foucault.  
Traditionally dominated by the idea of the progress of conscience or of the rationality or of 
the human thought, in a linear and progressive evolution, this discipline was facing itself with 
“different  series,  that  juxtapose  themselves,  succeed  or  cross  each  other,  without  the 
possibility of being reducted to a linear scheme”
9. The scales of time that were unfolding here 
were brief, not long.  The problem was not anymore one of “tradition and trace, but of cut and 
limit”
10.   
These shifts, both in history and in the history of ideas would be seen as an effect of a 
change in the way these disciplines faced the documents, not anymore as mere memory but as 
a matter for “recognizing in deep what men had been”, unfolding “a mass of elements that 
should be isolated, reunited, made relevant and where relations should be established and sets 
built”
11.  Another consequence of this shift would be that discontinuity would find a place in 
historical disciplines, not being seen anymore as the stigma the historian should always try to 
avoid.  The third consequence would be the fall of the idea of a “global history”, as the 
“reconstruction of the form of the evolution of a civilization, the material or spiritual principle 
of  a  society,  the  common  meaning  to  all  phenomenon  in  a  period  of  time,  the  law  that 
explains  its  cohesion  –  what  is  metaphorically  called  the  'face'  of  an  epoch”
12.  This 
conception of a Global History would make way for that of a General History, which would 
have the task of “determining what form of relation can legitimaly described between this 
different series, what vertical system they may form, what are, from ones to the others, the 
game of correlations and dominances; of what effect may be the displacements, the different 
temporalities, the several permanencies; in which different sets can certain elements appear 
                                                           
8 AS, 9. 
9 AS, 15. 
10 AS, 12. 
11 AS, 14. 
12 AS, 17. 4 
simultaneously; in brief, not only what series but what 'series of series', or, in other terms, 
what  'pictures' can be  constructed”
13.  The task  would not be to display  all phenomenon 
around a single center, but to unfold the space of a dispersion. 
All this would make an epistemological mutation of history in confrontation with what 
the philosophy of history had been, a struggle to give a sense to history, a thelos, to encounter 
the continuous evolution of the same principles, of the same origin, one of the faces of a 
system of thought that makes “the human conscience the originary subject of every coming-
to-be, of every practice”
14.  This themes are present since the XIXth century, under different 
forms:  saving  “the  sovereignty  of  subject  and  the  twin  figures  of  anthropology  and 
humanism”
15  from  the  descentration  operated  by  the  historical  analysis  of  production 
relations,  economic  determinations  and  classes  struggle  of  Marx;  or  by  nietzschean 
genealogy; or by the unvealing of the laws of desire by psycoanalysis. 
Finally, at the end of his introduction, Foucault affirms that the three previous books, 
mentioned above, inscribe themselves in an enterprise by which “one tries to measure the 
mutations that take place in history domains”
16, adding three forewords: this is not an attempt 
to transfer to the field of history a structuralistic method; nor to use the categories of cultural 
totalities; and it is marked by the attempt of a method of historical analysis which is released 
and exempt from the anthropological theme.  
At this point, Foucault also tries to clarify some misunderstandings that had – and still 
have – surrounded his previous books, such as the confessed attempt to use structural analysis 
in Naissance de la Clinique.  However, the most important one seems to be the statement that 
Les mots et les choses, due to lack of methodological outline “allowed that one believed in 
analyses in terms of cultural totality”
17. 
Foucault defines his enterprise as a historical analysis of discourse, in which categories 
such as tradition, influence, development, evolution, mentality, spirit, author, work (oeuvre), 
origin are suspended, not definitively rejected, but suspended.  All these images of the idea of 
historical continuity must be suspended in order to liberate discourse as difference, as event, 
as  irruption,  as  singularity.  Discourse  shall  not  be  reconstructed  by  psychological 
interpretation or linguistic analysis.  The task is to find “other forms of regularities, other 
types of relations”
18, relations between enouncements
19 (enoncés), relations between groups 
                                                           
13 AS, 18. 
14 AS, 21. 
15 Idem, ibidem. 
16 AS, .24-25. 
17 Idem, ibidem. 
18 AS, 41. 5 
of  enouncements  thus  established,  relations  between  enouncements  or  groups  of 
enouncements  and  events  of  an  entirely  different  order  (technical,  economical,  political, 
social). 
To establish these new relations, however, some decisions are required and criteria are 
requested.  “As far as conditions are defined clearly, it might be legitimate to constitute, from 
correctly  described  relations,  discursive  sets  which  would  not  be  arbitrary,  although  they 
remained invisible so far”
20.  A region is chosen for trying this, on the basis that the chosen 
region might present the possibility of numerous, dense relations, as well as easy to describe.  
The first approach to try the method, that's all, and the choice is the region of humanities, or 
the sciences of man.  
The second chapter of AS focuses on the so called discursive formations, which would 
be defined by a set of enouncements.  However, which is the criterium to group enoucements 
in a so called discursive formation?  Some attempts are made: the community of object; a 
common form or a common type of development, style (in a sense close to the one this notion 
is employed in literature); the use concepts in common; the persistence of the same themes.   
None of these criteria would be enough to explain the sense of unity assigned to large families 
of enouncements such as the economy or the grammar.  Foucault affirms to be involved by 
sets of enouncements which can't fit in a “logical architecture”, that “are not organized as a 
progressively deductive building”, neither “as the work of a collective subject”.    Foucault 
does not try to “isolate islands of coherence” or to “retrace chains of inference” or even to 
“build charts of differences”, but to study “forms of partition”, of distribution, “systems of 
dispersion”
21. 
At the end all this criteria will be combined, but also twisted, for what is being sought is 
nor coherence or identity, neither difference or contradiction, but certain kinds of relations, of 
a way all these enouncements function together . “In case it was possible to describe, among a 
certain  number of enouncements, such a dispersion system, in case  a regularity could be 
defined (an order, correlations, positions and functions, transformations) among the objects, 
the types of enunciation, the concepts, the thematical choices, one would be able to say, by 
convention, that this is a discursive formation (…).”
22    
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19 I try to translate the word used by Foucault in French, enoncé, and all the efforts Foucault made to distinguish 
it from proposition or phrase.  It has been translated to English before as statement, but I find this translation too 
close to the notion of phrase.  I am not sure the chosen translation is the best one and anyone might propose a 
better solution. 
20 AS, 41. 
21 AS, 51. 
22 Idem, ibidem. 6 
Foucault declares to be interested in identifying a) the way different discourses can be 
shaped from analogous rules (archaeological isomorphism); b) the way these rules function, 
the way they work, being this fashion the same in the different discourses analyzed or not 
(archaeological model); c) the way different concepts in different discourses may occupy an 
analogous  position  in  its  respective  positivity,  in  its  discursive  building  (archaeological 
isotopies)
23; d) the way the same notion can play a different role in different discourses, like 
the notion of evolution, or origin, for grammar and natural sciences (archaeological distance); 
e)  the  way  different  positivities  can  relate  by  subordination  or  complementarity
24 
(archaeological correlations)
25. 
Especial emphasis is put in one of the traces that would make it possible to identify or to 
propose a discursive formation: the submission of the enouncements to the same rules of 
formation, conditions to which they are submitted and that work as a condition of possibility 
for them to appear as discourse.  These rules of formation would retain vividly Foucault's 
attention.  In fact they are one of the points of contact between the so called archaeology of 
knowledge period and the genealogy of power period.  They coincide with what was already 
called as historical a priori in Les mots et les choses and will be again in AS be called this 
way
26. 
The fact that the rules of formation in each given discursive formation are named as 
something a priori refer to the fact that these rules function as a condition of possibility for 
the appearance of discourses as so, but why would them be called historical.  Foucault states 
that the study of these rules may help us understand that “history may be something other than 
a absolutely extrinsic contingency, it is not a necessity of the form which develops its own 
dialetics”.  This is to say that Foucault does not see history as the develop of any kind of 
previously given form, being this the kantian a priori forms of the transcendental subject or 
the gradual and progressive development of reason, or of an origin, which is to say there is no 
télos  in  history,  but  the  formation  rules  are  a  “purely  empiric  figure”,  “characterizing  a 
discursive  practice”
27.  He  doesn't  even  admit  a  changing  nature  of  a  subject,  a  variating 
essence that conditions history in each era, a changing transcendental form.  It is in the field 
of absolute empiricity that Foucault places it. 
                                                           
23 As Foucault tries to show in Truth and Juridical Forms, when he claims to be possible to identify isotopies 
when one compares ancient greek philosophy and ancient greek law. 
24 Like those exhaustively posed by Foucault, between Criminal Law and Psychiatry, for instance. 
25 See AS, 197-198. 
26 AS, 158. 
27 AS, 159. 7 
 A set of enouncements may be called a discursive formation if it is possible to show that 
“they all derive (despite their sometimes  extreme diversity, despite their dispersion along 
time) from the same set of relations”
28.  It is not the same to say that they express the same 
relations, for their diversity is given.  Foucault does not talk about a character of discourse 
itself, its linguistic nature or its logical structure
29, but about rules of formation.   
Hence the necessary relation of an enouncement and material institutions
30, what is to say 
instances of power.  Thus, a discursive formation corresponds to a discursive practice:  “a set 
of anonymous and historical rules, always determined in space and time, which defined in a 
given  period  and  to  a  determined  social,  economic,  geographic  or  linguistic  area  the 
conditions  of  use  of  enunciative  function”
31.  The  sets  of  enouncements  or  the  discursive 
formations, together with the discursive practices that correspond to each of them, included 
the  material  institutions  that  actualize  these  practices,  this  wider  set  of  enouncements,  as 
events, and things, as practical formations and material institutions, will be named archives
32. 
It must be pointed out that although a discursive practice is described above by Foucault 
as “determined in space and time” and as related “to a given period” of time, these periods are 
not determined in length or scale.  Furthermore, a discursive practice conditions a determined 
social, economic, geographic or linguistic area. The fact that Foucault uses an “or” here, 
instead  of  an  “and”  is  very  important.  We  are  not  dealing  with  structures  that  although 
empirical,  reign  above  every  domain  of  life  in  a  given  period  of  time.  This  is  the 
misunderstanding that Foucault recognized to make possible with the edition of Les mots et 
les choses, when he says that due to lack of methodological outline this work “allowed that 
one believed in analyses in terms of cultural totality”
33.  We quote a key passage on that: 
Nothing would be more false than seeing the analysis of discursive formations as an 
attempt for a totalitarian periodization: from a certain moment on e during a certain time, 
everyone would think the same way, despite the superficial differences, would say the same, 
by means of a polymorphic vocabulary, and would produce a kind of great discourse that 
could be covered indifferently in every direction. On the contrary, archaeology describes a 
level of enunciative homogeneity that has its own temporal cut and which does not carry with 
it all the other forms of identity and of differences that can be identified in language; and in 
this  level  establishes  an  order,  hierarchies  and  a  whole  net  that  exclude  a  massive  and 
                                                           
28 AS, 85. 
29 About the efforts of Foucault to establish the distinction between the enoucement and a proposition (logical) or 
a phrase (linguistical), see. AS, 99-109. 
30 AS, 129. 
31 AS, 147. 
32 AS, 160. 
33 Foucault (note 16). 8 
amorphous synchrony, given once and for all.  In the confuse unities that are called “eras”, it 
[archaeology] raises “enunciative periods”, with their special characters, which are articulated 
with each other but can be confused with each other, in the time of their concepts, in their 
theoretical phrases, formalization stages and grades of linguistic evolution.
34 
It  is  true  that  Foucault  takes  great  interest  in  the  moments  when  a  new  discursive 
formation arises, the rarest and most important moments for archaeology
35, but these events 
does not correspond to a culture shift or to a change of a civilization style, for the discursive 
formation is not seen as the spirit or the face of a time, of an era, but as a specific set of 
relations in a certain field or area, which changes are not necessarily synchronic, coherent and 
convergent with those of other fields or areas. 
Foucault also outlines the possibility of other archaeologies, besides an archaeology of 
knowledge, suggesting that the method might be used to produce an archaeology of ethics or 
an archaeology of political knowledge
36. 
In short, the great enterprise Foucault tries to put in movement is that of depriving history 
of every transcendental forms imposed on it and to claim that history can be thought as a fully 
immanent movement, made of events, singularities, in which difference may rise. 
All this having been said, we must turn to Agamben. 
We have already quoted a passage where he claims his method to be “archaeological and 
paradigmatic in a sense very close to that of Foucault, but not completely coincident with 
it”
37. The first thing that catches anyone's attention is the fact that the word “paradigmatic” 
was not used by Foucault to describe his method.  So in what sense a paradigmatic method 
can be close to Foucault's one? 
In Signatura Rerum. Sul metodo (2008)
38, Agamben makes it clearer.  Agamben claims 
that the efforts made by Foucault to avoid the term paradigm are due to his concerns that his 
ideas would not be confused with the thought of Thomas Kuhn.  Agamben quotes some of the 
passages of an interview to Fontana and Pasquino (1979) in which Foucault explicitly says 
about  the  notion  of  discursive  formations  that  “It  was  confused  too  often  with  the 
systematicity, theoretical form or something like the paradigm”
39. 
                                                           
34 AS, 183. 
35 AS, 209. 
36 AS, 233-237. 
37 Agamben (note 7). 
38 The pages quoted in this paper are from the original work by Giorgio Agamben, Signatura Rerum. Sul metodo. 
Roma:  Bollati  Boringhieri,  2008,  and  it  will  be  mentioned  just  as  SR.  It  was  published  in  English  as  The 
Signature of All Things: on Method. New York: Zone Books, 2009.  
39 Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 1994, tome III, p.144 apud SR, 16. 9 
The  subject  of  this  paper  is  not  to  show  why  Foucault's  and  Kuhn's  works  differ, 
according to Foucault himself and with Agamben, who claims: 
The Archéologie du Savoir has been read as a manifest for historiographic discontinuism.  
If this definition – which Foucault contested many times – is at a certain level correct, it is 
certain  that  in  this  book  he  [Foucault]  seems  to  take  interest,  above  all,  in  what  allows 
contexts and sets to be constituted, in the positive existence of “figures” and series.  However 
this contexts are produced according a very peculiar epistemological model, that is neither 
coincident with the one commonly used in historical research, nor with the kuhnian paradigm, 
and so that we will identify.
40 
Agamben is very brief though in outlining this peculiar foucaultian paradigmatic method.  
It  would  consist  in  isolating  a  paradigmatic  figure  or  case,  paradigmatic  in  the  sense  of 
exemplar, but this example is also taken as a “singular object that, being worth for all other 
objects of the same type, defines the intelligibility of the set, of which it is a part and that it 
constitutes, at the same time”
41.   
Agamben seems to choose the Panopticon as a first example of paradigm in Foucault's 
work,  but  he  quickly  adds  the  grand  enfermement,  the  confession,  the  inquiry,  the 
examination, the care of oneself.  “And so many other historical phenomena that are studied 
as paradigms that come from a very vast problematic context that, at the same time, they 
constitute and make intelligible – and this is the specificity of Foucault's research regarding 
historiography.”
42 
Agamben states that the homo sacer, the concentration camps, the Muselmann and the 
State  of  Exception  are  paradigms  in  this  sense,  but  also  the  trinitary  oikonomia    and 
acclamation.  However, one aspect, at least, calls our attention.  If we look at the way some of 
these paradigms are shaped by Agamben, we are driven to take a look at very long periods of 
time.  We would have to find a connection between the ancient figure of the homo sacer and 
the contemporary phenomenon of bare life, or between the roman acclamation of an Emperor 
and the mass media processes for consensus formation in contemporary democracies, or to a 
long genealogy of the trinitary oikonomia, since Aristotle, passing by stoicism, neoplatonism, 
gnosticism, Aquinas, to arrive at modern liberal economy. 
Of course, it is not just a matter of finding similarities or analogies. 
                                                           
40 SR, 18. 
41 SR., 19. 
42 Idem, ibidem. 10 
In  Il  Regno  e  la  Gloria.  Per  una  genealogia  teologica  dell'economia  e  del  governo 
(2007)
43, specially in the chapter named The Providential Machine, Agamben specifically 
confronts the Foucault's thesis of modern government origins, which according to Foucault, as 
is widely known, lays its roots in pastoral power.  The secularization of religious pastoral 
power would be the source of modern government.  For Foucault, the sixteenth century is the 
landmark  of  a  shift  between  the  medieval  conception  of  pastoral  power  to  the  modern 
conception of a God that does not reigns over the world directly, but only by means of certain 
principles  or  laws,  the  separation  of  Reign  and  Government.  For  Agamben,  Foucault 
committed  a  methodological  error  when  he  ignored  the  theological  texts,  loosing  the 
possibility  of  finding  a  deeper  continuity  in  the  theological  and  metaphysical  origins  of 
modern government in the trinitary oikonomia
44. 
So, there is not just analogy between theological trinitary oikonomia and the modern 
relations between economy and politics, but a deep genealogical thesis. 
In this sense the phrase pronounced by Leland De la Durantaye may have more deep 
consequences than the ones he identifies: “(...) it is Schmitt's political theology that lies at the 
heart of Agamben's ongoing Homo Sacer project”
45.  It seems that the schmittian thesis that 
there  is  a  theological  source  of  the  central  categories  of  modern  politics,  secularized 
theological concepts, has a deeper impact in Agambens work that one would see at a first 
glance. 
One or two misunderstandings can be however excluded.  What Agamben is doing is not 
an  attempt  to  reveal  something  about  the  essence  or  nature  of  man  or  of  history.  If  he 
proposes that things have happened and are happening this way, to be coherent with some of 
the most valuable premisses put by Foucault, it is something we can only empirically know.  
There is no authorization in Agamben's work to see this as an end developing in history, or 
deep necessary forces of life.  The archeaological method, with all its empiricity, “is the only 
way of access to present”
46 and the only hints on the future we can get, still, fortunately or 
not, open to difference and singularity.  As Deleuze says, in the appendix of his book on 
Foucault, concerning the death of man, we hope that the new form that is to come is not worse 
that its predecessors
47. 
                                                           
43 Giorgio Agamben, Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell'economia e del governo,Vicenza: 
Neri  Poza  (2007),  also  published  in  English  as  Giorgio  Agamben,  The  Kingdom  and  the  Glory.    For  a 
theological genealogy of economy and government. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011.  
44 Il Regno e la Gloria, op.cit.,123-129. 
45 Leland de la Durantaye,  Giorgio Agamben: a critical introduction.  Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
2009, 211. 
46 Agamben (note 7). 
47 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault. Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 140-141. 11 
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